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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohib-
its "unreasonable searches and seizures," and provides that "no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause."' Although its language is
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
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relatively clear, the application of the Fourth Amendment has created
more controversy than the application of perhaps any other constitu-
tional amendment.' Given the questions raised by a police-endorsed
practice of anticipatory search warrants,' the search and seizure debate
is far from over.
An anticipatory search warrant4 is a warrant based on a showing of
probable cause that particular evidence of a crime will exist at a specific
location in the future. 5 Challenges to the validity of prospective search
warrants generally focus on the absence of present probable cause.6
Finding that the benefits associated with this investigative device out-
weigh any inherent uncertainties, most lower courts have held that the
use of anticipatory search warrants under limited circumstances is not
unconstitutional per se.7 The United States Supreme Court, however,
has never addressed the constitutionality of prospective search war-
rants.8 A Supreme Court decision on anticipatory search warrants
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE at IX (2d ed. 1987) (stating that "it is beyond
question that the Fourth Amendment has been the subject of more litigation than any other provi-
sion in the Bill of Rights").
3. See DiPietro, Anticipatory Search Warrants, 59 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 27 (July
1990) (encouraging the use of anticipatory search warrants in the practice of law enforcement).
4. An anticipatory search warrant is also known as a prospective search warrant.
5. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 3.7(c), at 94.
6. Id. at 699. By definition, anticipation is an "act of doing or taking a thing before its
proper time," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added), and a prospective act
is one "contemplating the future." Id. at 1222.
7. See, e.g., Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991)1 United States v. Rey, 923
F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
348 (1989); United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005
(1989); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 869 (1978); United States v.
Outland, 476 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir.
1969); United States v. McElrath, 759 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Minn. 1991); United States v. Moore, 742
F. Supp. 727 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Rivera v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Zygarowski, 724 F. Supp. 1052
(D. Mass. 1989); United States v. McGriff, 678 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v.
Feldman, 366 F. Supp. 356 (D. Haw. 1973); Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980); Al-
vidres v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Commonwealth v. Soares, 424
N.E.2d 221 (Mass. 1981); People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 614 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972);
State v. Coker, 746 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988). But see United
States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985); United States
ex rel. Campbell v. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Flippen, 674 F. Supp. 536
(E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1988); State v. Berge, 634 P.2d 947 (Ariz. 1981).
8. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the prospective nature of search warrants indi-
rectly. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 102 (1979) (noting that "[a] search warrant is, by
definition, an anticipatory authorization"); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 n.19 (1979)
(finding that "[n]othing in the decisions of this Court ... indicates that officers requesting a war-
rant would be constitutionally required to set forth the anticipated means for execution"); United
1388
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would present the opportunity to reexamine the framework of the
Fourth Amendment.
In theory, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has sought to balance
individual privacy interests against law enforcement interests., Recent
decisions, however, have disturbed the search and seizure equilibrium
by favoring the government's interest in law enforcement over individ-
ual privacy interests.' ° A Supreme Court decision on anticipatory
search warrants could restore the traditional balance underlying the
Fourth Amendment by reexamining issues raised by prospective search
warrants such as the warrant requirement" and the present probable
cause inquiry.12 The Court also could provide much-needed guidance on
broader search and seizure concerns such as the probable cause doc-
trine" and the exclusionary rule.14 Moreover, a comprehensive exami-
nation of anticipatory search warrants by the Supreme Court would
bring greater stability to search and seizure jurisprudence.15
This Recent Development attempts to analyze the constitutionality
of anticipatory search warrants in a manner that allows for a critical
examination of the current status of the Fourth Amendment. Part II
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 450 n.15 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a] warrant
based on anticipated facts is premature and void"). The Court also has held wiretapping to be
constitutionally permissible pursuant to a warrant, thus implying that police may seize future con-
versations. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
9. As recently as 1990, the Court observed that "[o]ur cases show that in determining [the]
reasonableness [of a particular search], we have balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Maryland v.
Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1096 (1990); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 697, 703 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588
(1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
10. Scholars have observed that the Court's recent conservative bent has led to restrictions
on the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking
Fourth Amendment, 21 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 257 (1984); see also Doernberg, "The Right of the Peo-
ple". Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 259, 296 (1983); Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed. The Rise of a Public Place
Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 375, 375-76 (1986); Note, The
Pretext Problem Revisited: A Doctrinal Exploration of Bad Faith in Search and Seizure Cases,
70 B.U. L. REv. 111, 124 n.78 (1990). The retirement of Justices Brennan and Marshall likely will
strengthen the Court's conservative dominance.
11. See infra subpart V(A).
12. See infra subpart V(B).
13. See infra subpart V(B).
14. See infra subpart V(C).
15. While this Recent Development primarily explores the constitutional validity of anticipa-
tory search warrants, its broader purpose is to examine critically the framework of the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court, of course, could decide the validity of prospective search war-
rants without reaching other Fourth Amendment issues. Such an approach, however, would band-
age temporarily a doctrine in need of major surgery. Thus, this Recent Development suggests that
the Supreme Court should utilize the opportunity to examine the constitutionality of anticipatory
search warrants in order to restore the traditional balance under the Fourth Amendment.
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examines the Fourth Amendment issues raised by prospective search
warrants through a discussion of two recent lower court decisions. Part
III charts the erosion of the Fourth Amendment doctrines pertinent to
anticipatory search warrants. Part IV discusses the multifactor test pro-
posed in United States v. Garcia16 for determining the validity of pro-
spective search warrants. Part V demonstrates how the Supreme Court
could reaffirm the traditional values of the Fourth Amendment by care-
fully limiting the constitutional validity of anticipatory search warrants.
Part VI concludes that prospective search warrants could fit within the
constitutional framework in a way that helps attain a proper balance of
the interests underlying the Fourth Amendment.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
The use of anticipatory search warrants creates a variety of Fourth
Amendment concerns. The decisions in United States v. Goodwin17 and
United States v. Flippen'8 illustrate some of the issues that are raised
by these warrants.
The prosecutions in both Goodwin and Flippen arose out of a gov-
ernment child pornography reverse sting operation 9 known as "Opera-
tion Looking Glass. '2 0 The government created a Hong Kong company,
the Far Eastern Trading Company (Far Eastern), as an undercover
child pornography mail order service.2' After identifying the defendants
as possible subjects, 22 the government sent each target a catalog and an
order form, 23 and the defendants subsequently purchased materials
from the Far Eastern catalog.24 After the government received the
16. 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 348 (1989).
17. 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988).
18. 674 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1988).
19. In reverse sting operations, government agents provide individuals inclined to receive
contraband an opportunity to buy contraband material and then arrest them after completing the
transaction. See United States v. Frazier, 30 M.J. 1231, 1233 (A.C.M.R. 1990).
20. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 34, 36; Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 538. The Operation Looking Glass
investigation was designed to identify and prosecute persons who received child pornography in
the mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 34; Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 538.
21. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 34; Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 538.
22. Goodwin came to the government's attention when he placed an advertisement in a
"swinger's magazine." A test letter confirmed his interest in receiving child pornography. Goodwin,
854 F.2d at 34. United States v. Flippen involved two defendants, Clough and Flippen. Agents
identified Clough as a possible subject after the police reported numerous anonymous complaints
that young boys were spending a great deal of time near his home. Moreover, in a questionnaire
sent in conjunction with another undercover operation, Clough asserted that he collected pornog-
raphy. Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 538. Agents targeted Flippen after a postal inspector seized a child
pornography magazine addressed to him. The police also had received anonymous telephone com-
plaints alleging that young boys had been visiting his apartment. Id.
23. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 35; Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 538.
24. Goodwin and Clough each ordered four magazines with titles like Children Love, Torrid
1390 [Vol. 44:1387
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purchase orders, the Postal Service agents prepared for the controlled
delivery25 of the contraband.2 The agents then obtained anticipatory
search warrants for the pornographic materials.27 The prospective war-
rants were executed, the government agents seized various porno-
graphic contraband,28 and the defendants were indicted for receiving
child pornography in violation of Section 2252 of Title 18 of the United
States Code.29
A. The Goodwin Decision
Goodwin challenged the anticipatory search warrant on the
grounds that it violated the Fourth Amendment." He asserted that the
magistrate improperly issued the search warrant prior to the delivery of
the magazines.,31 Goodwin claimed that the prospective warrants were
unconstitutional because no probable cause existed to believe that the
pornographic materials were at his house at the time the warrant was
issued. 2
Following the analysis of the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Tots, and Boys Who Love Boys. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 35; Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 538. Flippen
purchased one such magazine and a video tape entitled Pre-Teen Trio. Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at
538.
25. One commentator has observed that government officials most commonly use anticipa-
tory warrants in controlled delivery cases. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 3.7(c), at 94-95.
26. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 35-36; Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 538.
27. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 36; Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 538.
28. In Goodwin the pornographic package was delivered at approximately 1:00 p.m. About
three hours later, the government executed the search warrant at the defendant's home and seized,
among other things, the child pornography magazines delivered that afternoon, evidence of corre-
spondence with Far Eastern, and "a large volume of nudist and sexually explicit material depicting
children as well as adults." 854 F.2d at 36.
In Flippen the search warrants obtained prior to the controlled deliveries were to be executed
once the pornographic packages arrived at the defendants' residences. After the government agent
witnessed the delivery to Flippen's house, they began the search and seized "over 530 video tapes
and nearly 30 magazines." 674 F. Supp. at 538. Details were not given about the materials recov-
ered from Clough's home.
29. Section 2252 provides:
(a) Any person who-
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been transported or
shipped in interstate or foreign commerce ... or mailed ... if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexu-
ally explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988).
30. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 36.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Hale,33 the Goodwin court affirmed the validity of anticipatory search
warrants. 4 In Hale, a case that also involved the controlled delivery of
child pornographic materials, the court reasoned that prior issuance of
a warrant was permissible when the evidence was on a "sure course" to
its destination, such as when it had been placed in the mail.3 5 The
Goodwin court observed that the government inspector's affidavit de-
scribed Goodwin's predisposition to, and requests for, child porno-
graphic materials, verified his residence, and assured the magistrate
that the materials would be delivered by mail.38 Consequently, the
court rejected Goodwin's probable cause challenge on the grounds that
the government had satisfied the "sure course" test.37
B. The Flippen Decision
In Flippen the defendants also attacked the anticipatory search
warrant for lack of probable cause.38 They argued that no probable
cause existed at the time of issuance to believe that the contraband
listed in the warrant was in their homes because that material was, in
fact, still in the government's possession. 9 Citing Brinegar v. United
States,0 the defendants asserted that the magistrate issued the search
warrant improperly because he had insufficient information to believe
the seizable items were located in the place to be searched.4'
Although it recognized Hale as the leading case on anticipatory
search warrants in the child pornography context, the Flippen court
rejected both the reasoning and the holding of Hale.42 The Flippen
court noted that Hale relied on United States v. Goff,43 a decision up-
holding the use of prospective warrants in drug contexts." The Flippen
court proceeded to distinguish the need for prospective warrants in
33. 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986).
34. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 36. The court also rejected Goodwin's alternative claim that the
government's conduct was so outrageous as to violate due process. Id. at 36-37. See also United
States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 1686 (1991);
United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
35. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 36 (quoting United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986)).
36. Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 36.
37. Id.
38. United States v. Flippen, 674 F. Supp. 536, 538-39 (E.D. Va. 1987), aft'd, 861 F.2d 266
(4th Cir. 1988).
39. Id.
40. 338 U.S. 160 (1949). See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
41. Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 539.
42. Id.
43. 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 539.
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child pornography cases from that in drug cases. 45 The court observed
that, unlike drug investigations, child pornography investigations in-
volve no exigency." That is, child pornography is not distributed or
consumed upon delivery; recipients of child pornography almost always
keep the contraband in their own homes. 47 Because the element of exi-
gency that exists in drug cases was lacking, the court reasoned that the
government had time to seek an ordinary warrant or a telephonic war-
rant.48 Therefore, the Flippen court held that anticipatory search war-
rants are impermissible in the context of, child pornography
investigations.49 The court could not suppress the evidence procured by
the anticipatory warrant, however, because the search fell within the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.5 0
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Warrant "Requirement"
In Katz v. United States51 the Supreme Court held that searches
and seizures conducted without a warrant "are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions. ' '52 The purpose of the warrant
requirement is to protect individual privacy interests by assuring that
governmental intrusions are properly limited." The warrant process
also provides the scrutiny of a detached and neutral magistrate to en-
sure that the intrusion is justified.5 With these safeguards in mind,
Katz established a per se warrant mandate.
Subsequent decisions, however, have limited significantly the prac-
tical impact of the Katz doctrine. The Supreme Court, for example, has
affirmed warrantless police intrusions by concluding that the activity
did not constitute a search or seizure and, therefore, did not invoke any
Fourth Amendment protections.5 Moreover, even if police activity rises
45. Id.
46. Id. For a discussion on the relationship between anticipatory search warrants and the
exigency exception, see infra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
47. Flippen, 674 F. Supp. at 539-40.
48. Id. at 540 & n.4. For a discussion on telephonic warrants, see Alpert, Telephonic Search
Warrants, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625 (1984).
49. Flippen 674 F. Supp. at 540.
50. Id. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). For a discussion of the relationship
between anticipatory search warrants and the good faith exception, see infra notes 153-60 and
accompanying text.
51. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
52. Id. at 357 (emphasis, footnote omitted).
53. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989).
54. Id.
55. In Katz the Court rejected the historical notion of a search as defined according to prop-
erty law concepts. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (finding that "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
1991] 1393
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1387
to the level of a search or seizure, it is likely that the act will fall within
one of the numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement.5" Conse-
quently, the potentially unequivocal Katz per se rule has withered into
a mere preference, and not a "requirement," for search warrants.5 7
B. The "Probable" Cause Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and seizures be
based on probable cause regardless of the existence of a warrant.55 Be-
cause probable cause, by definition, deals with probabilities,9 it is in-
herently impossible to quantify.6 0 In Brinegar v. United States61 the
Supreme Court reasoned that probable cause should be more than mere
suspicion, but less than the evidence needed for a conviction.2 In
choosing these parameters, the Court sought to balance the often con-
flicting interests in individual privacy and effective law enforcement.6"
Although the Supreme Court purports to adhere to this delicate
balance, recent decisions seem to tip the probable cause scale in favor
of the government's interest in law enforcement. The clearest illustra-
ple, not places"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In its place, Katz constructed a two-
pronged test to determine what constitutes a search: (1) a person must have "an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy"; and (2) that expectation must be "one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as 'reasonable.'" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Subsequent to its holding in
Katz, the Court has upheld many warrantless police intrusions by finding in each case that no
search occurred because the defendant could not have justifiably relied on a privacy expectation
under the circumstances. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971). See generally LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principlis in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 28 ARiz. L. REv. 291 (1986).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (automobile searches); South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory searches); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973) (border searches); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent
searches); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (stop and frisk); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances).
57. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (stating "we have expressed a strong
preference for warrants and declared that 'in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant
may be sustainable where without one it would fail' ") (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 106 (1965)); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
58. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-79 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959).
59. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (noting that probable cause concerns
"the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act").
60. See Cook, Probable Cause to Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REv. 317 (1971).
61. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
62. Id. at 175.
63. Id. at 176.
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tion of this trend is the evolving permissive standard for evaluating
probable cause based on an informant's tip.
In Aguilar v. Texas" the Supreme Court announced a two-pronged
test to establish probable cause based on an informant's tip. In order to
get a warrant under this test, the government had to demonstrate: (1)
the informant's basis of knowledge-the "basis-of-knowledge" prong;
and (2) the credibility of the informant or the reliability of his state-
ment-the "veracity" prong. 5 The Court refined and clarified the two-
pronged test in Spinelli v. United States.6 6 According to Spinelli, ex-
tensive detail in a tip could cure an insufficiency in the basis-of-knowl-
edge prong, because such detail would indicate that the informant was
relying on more than mere rumor.6 7 Spinelli also recognized that inde-
pendent corroboration could remedy a deficiency in the veracity
prong."' If both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test were met, the in-
formant's tip would establish probable cause.
In Illinois v. Gates6 the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-
Spinelli test and replaced it with a "totality-of-the-circumstances" ap-
proach.70 The Gates Court reasoned that while the two prongs were
highly relevant,7 1 they should not be dispositive in a magistrate's proba-
ble cause determination.7 2 The Court noted that the basis-of-knowledge
and veracity prongs are not independent of one another; a strong show-
ing in one may compensate for a deficiency in the other.7 Gates im-
plied that courts should not apply rigid rules to determine the existence
of probable cause.7 4 After Gates a magistrate simply must consider all
the relevant circumstances and make a common-sense determination as
to probable cause.75
On the positive side, by adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances
test, the Gates Court sought to encourage the use of search warrants. 16
64. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
65. [T]he magistrate must be informed of [1] some of the underlying circumstances from
which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and [2]
some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant
... was "credible" or his information "reliable."
Id. at 114.
66. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
67. Id. at 416; see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
68. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415.
69. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
70. Id. at 238.
71. Id. at 230.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 233.
74. Id. at 230-32.
75. Id. at 238.
76. See id. at 236.
1991] 1395
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On the negative side, however, the Gates decision disrupted the delicate
balance between private and governmental interests that the Aguilar-
Spinelli model established.77 Consequently, like the warrant "require-
ment, '78 the "probable" cause doctrine of the Fourth Amendment is
weaker because of judicial construction favoring the interests of law
enforcement.
C. The "Exclusionary" Rule
The exclusionary rule, a judicially created remedy, provides that
evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights
must be suppressed from the government's case-in-chief.79 Although the
Supreme Court has noted several justifications for this doctrine,80 the
rule serves primarily to deter unconstitutional police action."s In theory,
the exclusionary rule protects individuals' privacy interests by removing
the incentive for police to disregard the Constitution. 2 Even though the
rule sometimes may bar the admission of probative evidence, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that without this remedy the Fourth
Amendment would be essentially meaningless.8 3
Although powerful in principle, decisions construing the exclusion-
ary rule have limited its application severely. As a primary restriction,
the Court has narrowed the scope of the rule through a strict standing
doctrine. 84 The test for challenging evidence under the exclusionary rule
77. Gates has attracted a great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause,"
"Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REv. 551 (1984); Mascolo, Probable Cause Revisited: Some
Disturbing Implications Emanating from Illinois v. Gates, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 331 (1983). But
see Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U.
MicH. J.L. REF. 465 (1984).
78. See supra subpart I1(A).
79. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
80. Under a "privacy" rationale, the exclusionary rule prohibits further invasion of privacy
by suppressing the evidence from an unlawful search or seizure. Contra United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974). The "judicial integrity" rationale rests on the theory that courts should not
become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold." El-
kins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
81. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (stating that "the 'prime purpose' of
the rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct'" (quoting Calandra, 414
U.S. at 347)); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (explaining that the exclusionary rule is "designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect"); Elkins, 364 U.S. at
217 (noting that the exclusionary rule is "calculated to prevent, not to repair").
82. The protection of individual privacy is a natural consequence of police deterrence. See
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354 (finding that "[tihe purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy of one's person, house, papers, or effects").
83. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (noting that without the exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amend-
ment would be reduced to "a form of words").
84. Standing is a principle by which the court determines whether a person is a proper party
to request adjudication of a certain issue. See Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
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has evolved from automatic8 5 standing to the requirement of a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy.86 Even if the defendant can suppress the
unconstitutionally obtained evidence from the government's case-in-
chief, the government still can introduce the evidence for impeachment
purposes. 7 Furthermore, while the exclusionary rule should suppress all
evidence derived from an illegal search or seizure, this so-called fruit of
the poisonous tree 8 may nonetheless be admitted under the indepen-
dent source exception,89 the inevitable discovery doctrine,90 or through
a finding of attenuation of the taint.91 With so many loopholes, one
must question whether the "exclusionary" rule could ever live up to its
name.
If these limitations had not already rendered the exclusionary rule
meaningless, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Leon92
diluted the doctrine almost to that point. In Leon the Supreme Court
adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allowing the
admission of evidence acquired under a defective search warrant.93 In
creating this exception, the Court reasoned that the deterrence ration-
ale does not apply to officers acting under an objectively valid warrant
because the exclusionary rule was intended to deter police misconduct,
not judicial errors.9 ' According to the majority's analysis, the judicial-
deterrence benefits of excluding evidence seized pursuant to an invalid
warrant do not outweigh the costs of suppression-fewer convictions
85. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
86. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). The current standing requirement parallels the
Katz test for determining whether there was a search or seizure. See supra note 56 and accompa-
nying text.
87. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
88. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine posits that all evidence (the "fruit") derived
from an illegal search (the "poisonous tree") must be suppressed, whether it was obtained directly
through the illegal search itself, or indirectly using information obtained in the illegal search. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939).
89. The independent source exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine permits
evidence obtained after an illegal search to be admitted if it can be traced to a legitimate source
outside of the unlawful search. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-15 (1984).
90. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence obtained in an illegal search may be
admitted if the prosecution can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately would have been discovered by lawful means. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444
(1984).
91. The attenuation of the taint doctrine posits that in certain cases the connection between
the original illegal conduct and the evidence sought to be excluded may become so attenuated that
admission of the evidence would not implicate the constitutional values underlying the exclusion-
ary rule. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491; Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
92. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
93. Id. at 913; see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981 (1984).
94. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17.
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and lighter sentences.9
In creating the good faith exception, the Court hoped both to en-
courage the police to use warrants and to heighten the credibility of the
issuing magistrate's determination of probable cause. 8 The Court care-
fully structured the exception to avoid making the exclusionary rule
necessarily inapplicable whenever a police officer acts pursuant to a
warrant.9 7 Nevertheless, like other recent Fourth Amendment deci-
sions,98 Leon placed another weight on the scale in favor of the interests
of law enforcement at the expense of individual privacy interests. This
Recent Development suggests how the Supreme Court can recognize the
constitutionality of another police practice-anticipatory search war-
rants-without completely knocking the scale to the ground.
IV. THE GARCIA MODEL
In United States v. Garcia9 the defendants, participants in a co-
caine operation, employed military servicemen stationed in Panama to
smuggle cocaine into the United States. 100 On one drug run, customs
officials searched two of the servicemen couriers and discovered thirty-
three kilograms of cocaine.10 1 Thereafter, the couriers agreed to assist
the government with a controlled delivery of the contraband.1 02 Before
the cocaine was delivered, the drug enforcement agents obtained an an-
ticipatory warrant to search the targeted apartment.103 The execution of
the prospective warrant was contingent on the delivery of the contra-
band. 0 4 Shortly after the couriers delivered the drugs, the agents en-
tered the premises, searched the apartment, and seized the cocaine
along with other incriminating evidence. 05
95. Id.
96. Id. at 913-16.
97. The good faith exception does not apply in situations in which the officer did not have
reasonable grounds to believe the warrant was properly issued. The exception could not be invoked
if the officer acted under a misleading or facially deficient warrant or if the magistrate "wholly
abandoned his judicial role." Id. at 923.
98. See supra subparts III(A) & (B).
99. 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 348 (1989).
100. Id. at 700.
101. The customs officials initiated the search after noticing that the servicemen appeared
nervous and that one was named on a "customs alert list." Id. For a discussion on the legal justifi-
cation for searches of suspected drug couriers, see Special Project, Drug Couriers and the Fourth
Amendment: Vanishing Privacy Rights for Commercial Passengers, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1311 (1990).
102. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 701. See supra note 25.
103. The agents received a prospective warrant to search the apartment for "cocaine, traces
of cocaine, currency, drug records, and narcotics paraphernalia." 882 F.2d at 701.
104. Id.
105. In addition to the 33 kilograms of cocaine, the agents seized airline stickers and Pana-
manian newspapers. Id.
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Throughout the trial' and on appeal, Wilson-Grant, a codefend-
ant in the conspiracy, moved to suppress the materials seized in the
search.107 She argued that the magistrate issued the search warrant im-
properly because no probable cause existed at the time of issuance to
believe that the contraband was located on the premises. °s Wilson-
Grant asserted that an anticipatory search warrant based on an expec-
tation of future probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. 09
In rejecting this argument, the Garcia court observed that although
anticipatory search warrants, by definition, are issued before the events
necessary to trigger a search have transpired, such warrants do not lack
probable cause. 10 The court focused on the existence of probable cause
at the moment of execution, rather than at the issuance of the search
warrant."' The Second Circuit reasoned, therefore, that sufficient prob-
able cause would be present at the time of the search if: (1) the govern-
ment agent produces independent evidence indicating a "sure course""' 2
of delivery; and (2) the magistrate conditions- the warrant's execution
on the occurrence of that delivery."'
The Garcia court clarified the nature of these restrictions. In order
to provide the magistrate with independent evidence that the contra-
band will be located at the premises upon execution, the government's
affidavit must show: (1) that the agent believes that the delivery will
occur; (2) how the agent obtained his belief; (3) the reliability of the
agent's sources; and (4) the role the agent will play in the delivery." 4
Additionally, in accordance with the second prong of the Garcia test,
the magistrate should condition the anticipatory warrant explicitly on a
stated occurrence to prevent both premature execution and manipula-
tion by government officials." 5 Finally, the Garcia court remarked that
106. Both before and during the trial, Wilson-Grant moved to suppress the items recovered
during the search. The district court consistently rejected her arguments. Id.
107. The court of appeals recognized that Wilson-Grant, a nonresident of the apartment,
may have lacked standing to bring this claim due to an insufficient privacy expectation in the
premises. Id.; see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. The government, however, waived the
standing argument since it did not raise the claim in the district court. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 701.
108. Id. at 702. Alternatively, Wilson-Grant argued that even if the warrant was validly is-
sued, it was executed prematurely because the contraband had not been delivered when the agents
entered the premises. The court, however, found that the courier's entrance into the apartment
constituted "sufficient delivery" and thus fulfilled the condition necessary for execution. Id. at 704.
109. Id. at 702.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
869 (1978)).
112. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
113. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702.
114. Id. at 703; United States v. Moore, 742 F. Supp. 727, 734 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
115. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04. If the stated contingency does not occur, the warrant be-
comes void. Id. at 702; Moore, 742 F. Supp. at 734.
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the magistrate should strictly observe the particularity requirement of
the Fourth Amendment in order to limit governmental abuse of pro-
spective warrants. 116
In holding that anticipatory search warrants are not unconstitu-
tional per se if issued within the enumerated guidelines, the Garcia
model sought to balance both the interests of law enforcement and indi-
vidual Fourth Amendment rights. 117 The court recognized that prospec-
tive warrants encourage government officials to obtain judicial approval
of a search." 8 The court also observed that an anticipatory search war-
rant may be an effective device when police officials must act under
narrow time constraints." 9 The Garcia court reasoned that an agent
should obtain a prospective warrant under such conditions rather than
proceed under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement and
risk suppression under the exclusionary rule. 20 In sum, the Garcia
model attempts to fit anticipatory search warrants, an effective law en-
forcement tool, within the Fourth Amendment frhmework without sig-
nificantly diminishing individual privacy interests.
V. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
By addressing the constitutional validity of anticipatory search
warrants, the Supreme Court could reexamine the framework of the
Fourth Amendment. 2' Although in theory the Fourth Amendment at-
tempts to balance individual privacy interests against the aims of law
enforcement, in practice decisions have favored the latter concern. 22 A
proper constitutional analysis of anticipatory search warrants could di-
rect the amendment toward its necessary equilibrium.
A. The Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court could strengthen the warrant requirement by
upholding the constitutionality of prospective search warrants. As the
Garcia court observed, anticipatory warrants encourage law enforce-
116. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 704; Moore, 742 F. Supp. at 734. The particularity requirement of
the Fourth Amendment limits the authorization to search to specific areas or items for which prob-
able cause exists, thus prohibiting "general" search warrants. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 4.5.
117. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. The Supreme Court, in fact, has granted certiorari in a case arising out of the Goodwin
and Flippen factual situation. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991). In Jacobson the Eighth Circuit reviewed the government's
involvement in the reverse sting operation under the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, but
unfortunately did not address the constitutionality of anticipatory search warrants.
122. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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ment officials to use the warrant process.' A search conducted under a
warrant protects individual privacy interests from unauthorized govern-
mental intrusion by providing an impartial judicial officer's oversight. 124
Since the availability of prospective warrants invites greater use of war-
rants, protection of individual privacy should increase in accordance
with such police practice.
Although Katz established a per se warrant requirement, numerous
exceptions have minimized the force of this rule. 25 Anticipatory search
warrants could redirect the Fourth Amendment focus toward the Katz
mandate by restricting the need for at least one of the exceptions to the
Katz rule-the exigency exception. 126 As the Garcia court noted, police
officials can seek anticipatory warrants even under narrow time con-
straints. 27 Since by definition prospective warrants anticipate the un-
lawful activity, the availability of these warrants should reduce the
number of exigencies that otherwise would justify a warrantless search.
By obtaining an anticipatory search warrant, a police officer promotes
individual privacy interests by seeking a magistrate's supervision. 28
Since this rationale applies to any warrant exception whose justification
is exigency, 29 anticipatory search warrants could be the initial step to-
ward reestablishing Katz as the rule, rather than the exception.
The Katz Court, however, did not contemplate the use of anticipa-
tory search warrants. Prospective search warrants that are based on a
showing of future probable cause differ from their traditional counter-
parts. Unlike warrantless searches, searches employing anticipatory
warrants under exigent circumstances are more likely to be justified po-
lice intrusions due to the additional protection supplied by the warrant
process.130 When law enforcement officials are not acting under such
time pressure, no apparent justification exists for deviating from the
traditional search warrant. Therefore, some courts reason that anticipa-
tory search warrants should be restricted to situations involving
exigency.' 3'
123. See supra text accompanying note 118.
124. See supra text accompanying note 54.
125. See supra text accompanying note 56.
126. Exigency refers to emergency situations requiring an immediate warrantless search. See
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
128. See supra text accompanying note 54.
129. See Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. 1977) (stating that "every 'exception'
to the warrant requirement derives from an emergency situation, where to obtain a search warrant
would defer police activity that must be performed punctually to be effective").
130. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
131. See supra subpart II(B). The Flippen court placed the exigency limitation on anticipa-
tory search warrants by holding that the use of such warrants is impermissible in the context of
child pornography investigations because government officials have time to seek a search warrant
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This limit on prospective warrants would be problematic, however.
Government officials typically seek anticipatory search warrants in con-
trolled delivery cases. 32 In this setting, the police generally cannot en-
sure a priori the exigency necessary to conduct a warrantless search.
133
If a magistrate could not issue an anticipatory warrant in controlled
delivery situations, the officer has two remaining options: (1) foregoing
the search until sufficient evidence arises to obtain a traditional war-
rant; or (2) searching without a warrant in hope of a later judicial find-
ing of a warrant exception. Neither choice properly balances the
competing interests of the Fourth Amendment. Under the first option,
while individual privacy interests might benefit from the increased
probable cause scrutiny, the costs to law enforcement in terms of lost
convictions would be too great. Courts also should discourage the sec-
ond alternative because the individual privacy interest suffers when po-
lice searches are conducted without judicial supervision. Anticipatory
search warrants effectively resolve this dilemma.
The Garcia model for allowing anticipatory search warrants per-
mits an adequate balancing of Fourth Amendment interests. By requir-
ing that the government prove that the contraband is on a "sure
course" to its destination,' the Garcia model shields individuals from
unjustified searches. Since the magistrate further conditions the war-
rant's execution on a stated occurrence,3 5 the court retains the neces-
sary supervisory power while the government benefits from the use of
another law enforcement device. A carefully structured anticipatory
search warrant procedure balances Fourth Amendment considerations
by allowing future searches only upon the occurrence of specific
contingencies.
B. The Probable Cause Doctrine
Since anticipatory search warrants generally are challenged on the
basis of inadequate probable cause,3 6 the Supreme Court also has the
opportunity to clarify the probable cause doctrine. By addressing the
Garcia model for probable cause, the Court also could reevaluate the
propriety of the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances test.
through normal channels. See United States v. Flippen, 674 F. Supp. 536, 540 (E.D. Va. 1987),
aff'd, 861 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1988).
132. See supra note 25.
133. In the controlled delivery of child pornography, for example, generally no exigency ex-
ists because collectors typically retain the contraband in their homes. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 46-47.
134. See supra text accompanying note 112.
135. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
136. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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A defendant typically attacks the constitutionality of prospective
search warrants by claiming that no present probable cause existed at
the time of issuance. 3 " According to this argument, a magistrate may
issue a search warrant only upon a showing of probable cause that the
criminal evidence is located in a specified place at that time.13 Since an
anticipatory search warrant is based on probable cause that the object
of the search will be at a particular place in the future, and not that it
is currently there, the defendant infers a Fourth Amendment
violation."3 '
The present probable cause argument, however, contains an inher-
ent flaw. As the Garcia court reasoned, the critical probable cause in-
quiry should focus on the likelihood that the criminal evidence will be
found in a particular place on execution, not on issuance, of the search
warrant. 40 While present possession may indicate a probability of fu-
ture possession, anticipatory search warrants can predict with greater
certainty the object's location at the time of the search.' By obtaining
a prospective search warrant, police officers minimize the risk that
probable cause information may become stale, 42 a concern particularly
troublesome in the controlled delivery context. 143 Furthermore, a magis-
trate could guard against the opposite concern, premature execution, by
conditioning the validity of an anticipatory search warrant on a speci-
fied occurrence.'4 4 With a prospective search warrant, the government
gains an effective law enforcement device, while an impartial magis-
trate's determination that there will be probable cause at the time of
the intrusion protects individual privacy interests.
To obtain a warrant based on probable cause for a future search,
the government's affidavit must provide a magistrate with sufficient in-
formation to conclude that the seizable evidence will be at the specified
137. See supra text accompanying note 6.
138. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981) (stating that "[a] search warrant
. . . is issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is
located in a particular place, and therefore safeguards an individual's interest in the privacy of his
home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police").
139. See supra notes 6, 31 & 41 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
141. People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 614, 617 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). See 2 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 3.7(c), at 97-98.
142. A search warrant becomes "stale" when the information upon which its issuance is
based has become so dated as to no longer give rise to probable cause. See Syro v. United States,
287 U.S. 206 (1932). The degree of delay that will make probable cause information "stale" de-
pends on the particular facts of the case. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 3.7(a).
143. See, e.g., State v. Gallant, 531 A.2d 1282, 1284 (Me. 1987); People v. David, 326 N.W.2d
485, 487-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Broilo, 228 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
144. In controlled delivery situations, for example, actual delivery would be the specified oc-
currence. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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location upon execution.'45 The Garcia model provides a judicial officer
with criteria for determining the probable cause needed to issue a pro-
spective warrant. According to the Garcia test, a magistrate must be
satisfied that the evidence is on a "sure course" to its destination. 4" To
fulfill this requirement, the government's affidavit must show, among
other things, the officer's basis of knowledge and the reliability of his
sources.
147
Since the Garcia model closely parallels the two-pronged Aguilar-
Spinelli test,'48 the Supreme Court could undertake a much-needed re-
evaluation of the propriety of the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances
test while determining the validity of anticipatory search warrants. The
Gates Court mischaracterized the Aguilar-Spinelli test as unduly
rigid ' 49 because structured criteria are needed for a magistrate to deter-
mine probable cause with greater accuracy. While the Gates test en-
ables a judicial officer to issue more warrants, the probable cause
doctrine suffers in the process. By eliminating the independent status
of the two prongs, Gates permits a magistrate to issue warrants based
on less than credible information. 50 In effect, under the standardless
Gates approach, the police officer, not the magistrate, determines the
existence of probable cause.' 5' The totality-of-the-circumstances test
unduly favors law enforcement interests at the cost of individual pri-
vacy interests.
The Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test recognized the inherent dif-
ficulty of measuring probable cause based on an informant's tip. Since
anticipatory search warrants depend on an equally problematic deter-
mination-probable cause for a future search-an issuing magistrate
similarly should have heightened guidance in order to limit the poten-
tial for government abuse. The multifactor Garcia test compensates for
the uncertainty associated with prospective search warrants. By requir-
ing a more intense probable cause scrutiny for anticipatory search war-
145. Glen, 282 N.E.2d at 617. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 3.7(c), at 97-98.
146. See supra text accompanying note 112.
147. As a final prerequisite to issuance, Garcia instructs the magistrate to condition the exe-
cution of the anticipatory search warrant upon a stated occurrence. See supra note 113 and accom-
panying text.
148. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
149. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 225-30 (1983).
150. For example, a highly detailed tip does not necessarily support the veracity of an in-
formant. Similarly, information from an informant with a strong reputation for truthfulness does
not automatically demonstrate a basis for knowing. See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 3.3(b).
151. Professor Abraham Goldstein observed that magistrates rarely inquire into the issue of
probable cause in any detail. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Re-
view, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173, 1182-83 (1987). To meet the reliability and credibility goals of the
warrant process, Professor Goldstein argues for the institution of a process-oriented standard for
the post-warrant review of a magistrate's probable cause finding. Id. at 1215-17.
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rants, the Supreme Court could take the initial step toward correcting
the erosion of probable cause that is epitomized by the Gates standard.
This requirement would result in a more equitable balance of all Fourth
Amendment interests.
C. The Exclusionary Rule
Finally, the Supreme Court must consider how a decision validat-
ing anticipatory search warrants would affect the exclusionary rule. In
theory, the exclusionary rule deters unconstitutional privacy invasions
by excluding illegally obtained evidence from the government's case-in-
chief.152 The rule has lost much of its deterrent power, however, partic-
ularly after Leon established the good faith exception.153 The Supreme
Court's endorsement of yet another type of search warrant on which
police could claim good faith reliance could weaken the exclusionary
rule further.' Alternatively, in upholding the constitutionality of an-
ticipatory search warrants, the Court could reassess Leon in order to
return the Fourth Amendment balance that underlies the exclusionary
rule.
The Supreme Court should seize this opportunity to reexamine the
value of the good faith exception.'55 In Leon the Court relied on the
substantial costs incurred in applying the exclusionary rule to justify
the good faith exception while admitting that the rule's impact was "in-
substantial.' ' s The Supreme Court also focused mistakenly on the im-
propriety of deterring the behavior of the issuing magistrate. 57 While
152. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
153. See Note, Errors in Good Faith: The Leon Exception Six Years Later, 89 MicH. L. REv.
625, 627 (1990) (stating that "the exclusionary rule's goal of deterrence would best be served by
the pre-Leon rule which, because it retained a simple, inviolate exclusionary sanction in its central
application, would more often be properly enforced"); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and De-
terrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1016, 1030-55
(1987) (an empirical study of the Narcotics Section of the Chicago Police Department showed that
the exclusionary rule deters unlawful police searches and the Leon good faith exception under-
mines this deterrence).
154. The Flippen decision illustrates the need to review the good faith exception as part of a
proper examination of anticipatory search warrants. See supra subpart II(B).
155. See generally Note, A Middle Ground Approach to the Exclusionary Remedy: Recon-
ciling the Redaction Doctrine with United States v. Leon, 41 VAD. L. RE V. 811, 821-34 (1988)
(noting the flaws in the Leon Court's rationale and the adverse consequences of that decision).
156. Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (noting that "[tihe substantial
social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have
long been a source of concern") with id. at 907 n.6 (recognizing that researchers "have concluded
that the impact of the exclusionary rule is insubstantial").
This inconsistency is magnified further by the realization that the Court manipulated the data
underlying the cost inquiry in order to create the good faith exception. Leon based the costs of the
exclusionary rule on all cases instead of focusing on those in which evidence would be suppressed
despite a facially valid warrant. See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 1.3(c), at 52.
157. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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the exclusionary rule seeks primarily to deter unconstitutional police
action, it stands more broadly as a check on the entire warrant process.
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment inherently restricts the discretion of
both the police and the issuing judicial officer. 158 Consequently, if the
exclusionary rule cannot suppress evidence procured under a defective
search warrant, the integrity of the warrant system and the Fourth
Amendment suffers.
The good faith exception gives undue weight to the interests of law
enforcement over those of individual privacy. In ruling on the constitu-
tionality of anticipatory search warrants, the Supreme Court could ad-
dress this inequity. As the Garcia court noted, prospective search
warrants, by their nature, are subject to abuse by the government. 159
The Supreme Court would expand this potential for abuse if it ex-
tended the Leon good faith exception to anticipatory search war-
rants. 110 By refusing to apply the good faith exception to prospective
search warrants, however, the Court could minimize police misconduct
and move toward reestablishing the proper balance of Fourth Amend-
ment interests.''
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should uphold the constitutionality of antici-
patory search warrants. Because of the specialized nature of these war-
rants, however, the Court must restrict their use. The multifactor
Garcia test compensates for the uncertainty inherent in prospective
search warrants. By adopting the Garcia model, the Court would vali-
date another investigative tool for law enforcement agents and simulta-
neously protect individual privacy interests under the Fourth
Amendment.
158. The Fourth Amendment contains several inherent restrictions:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis added).
159. Anticipatory search warrants are particularly susceptible to manipulation by the govern-
ment because these warrants are based on probable cause for a future search. See supra notes 115-
16 and accompanying text.
160. The exclusionary rule's traditional deterrence is needed to minimize the government's
potential misuse of anticipatory search warrants. For example, if a court invalidates a prospective
search warrant under the Garcia model, but nevertheless admits the evidence procured by the
illegal search under the good faith exception, the deterrence and individual privacy protections
provided by the multifactor anticipatory search warrant test are lost.
161. The Supreme Court recently observed that "[t]he occasional suppression of illegally ob-
tained yet probative evidence has long been considered a necessary cost of preserving overriding
constitutional values." James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 651 (1990).
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Although the Fourth Amendment, in theory, seeks to balance indi-
vidual privacy interests against law enforcement interests, the judicial
trend has manipulated the scale in favor of law enforcement. A proper
analysis of anticipatory search warrants would correct this inequity. By
upholding the use of prospective search warrants, the Supreme Court
could empower the Katz per se rule by limiting the need for exceptions
to the warrant requirement. By following the Garcia model, the Court
could strengthen the probable cause doctrine by addressing the short-
comings of the standardless Gates totality-of-the-circumstances test.
Finally, the Court could restore the exclusionary rule by finding that
the good faith exception impairs the integrity of the warrant process
and the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court should take the opportunity to repair the
framework of the Fourth Amendment through a traditionally sound
analysis of anticipatory search warrants. Although this Recent Develop-
ment represents an idealistic view of the underlying values of the
Fourth Amendment, all hope of balancing individual privacy and law
enforcement interests is not lost. In the words of Justice Antonin
Scalia, "there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the pri-
vacy of us all. ' 162 Amen.
David P. Mitchell*
162. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
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versity School of Law for their helpful comments in the preparation of this Recent Development.
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